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ABSTRACT
There are many hurdles that adult adoptees face when seeking access to personal
information contained in original birth records or adoption proceedings. One such
hurdle is the widely-used good cause standard, which requires adoptees seeking
information to show good cause to obtain access. This standard is problematic
primarily for its vagueness. Very few jurisdictions that use this standard define
“good cause” in any meaningful way, and case law interpreting good cause statutory
language is inconsistent at best. Although it is meant to protect the privacy interests
of all parties in an adoption proceeding, the good cause standard acts as a barrier to
those seeking information about their history. While recognizing that progressive
legislative solutions are ideal, this Note proposes to shift the burden in jurisdictions
where the good cause standard still applies; courts should be required to show good
cause to keep records sealed, consistent with other areas of records access and first
amendment jurisprudence.
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INTRODUCTION

H

e closes his laptop after writing an unremarkable email about his
current endeavors and trials, the most recent link in a long chain
of communications. Looking back into the email chain, the topics
become increasingly more sensitive, discussing relatives he has never
met or meeting the brother he never knew he had. Peering further back
into the chain of emails reveals a flood of emotions between the writer
and the recipient, expressing gratitude for entering one another’s lives,
and affirming a part of them that, in his case, has been missing for a
lifetime. There is joy in the emails, and an eagerness to learn all that
the other could possibly convey.
The genesis of this long chain of communications goes back to the
moment the writer first met his biological mother. This moment was
not exclusively their own, as it would not have been made possible
without the unwavering support from the writer’s loved ones, who
never dissuaded him from tracing his biological past. The moment of
reunification affirms the close familial bond that every human being
understands to be fundamental—the bond between a biological mother
and her child. But unlike all those who have distant memories made
hazy with an accumulation of constant contact and the passage of time,
the writer’s first memory of his biological mother is as clear as day.
This memory remains fresh because the writer did not meet the woman
long ago as an infant, but rather, as a fully matured adult. He reminds
himself that she appreciates the moment they shared as much as he
does, which enables him to settle his mind and realize that he is
blessed.
The writer does not forget, however, that there are many other
adult adoptees like himself who cannot make contact with their
biological parents. Whereas the writer sought out his biological mother
for personal fulfillment, other adult adoptees may seek out their
biological parents for different reasons, such as exploration of their
medical histories,1 or identification of property rights.2 Accessing
court adoption proceedings or birth records can provide adult adoptees
with a wealth of information about their past, however gaining access
to these documents can prove quite burdensome. Unlike non-adopted
adults, who are able to look into their past uninhibitedly simply by
1
2

In re Adoption of Spinks, 232 S.E.2d 479, 482-83 (N.C. Ct. App. 1977).
Massey v. Parker, 369 So. 2d 1310, 1314 (La. 1979).
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virtue of being raised by biological parents, adult adoptees often face
significant obstacles when trying to connect the dots of their earlier
years. Perhaps the greatest barrier that adult adoptees face is the
common law “good cause” requirement to access sealed records.3
This Note examines the “good cause” standard for accessing
adoption records and explores its scope. Further, this Note identifies
the hurdles that the good cause standard creates when adult adoptees
attempt to access their birth or adoption records, and suggests a
possible solution by advocating for a shift in the burden of proof from
the adult adoptee to the court. The court would be required to show
good cause to keep records sealed in a manner similar to common
practices in other record requesting scenarios. This reform would
likely require a qualified consent otherwise in favor of the adult
adoptee, consistent with shifting societal attitudes toward adoption and
transparency.
II.

THE GOOD CAUSE STANDARD

In the area of records access law, there is a long recognized right of
access to public records.4 Public policy recognizes “the citizen’s desire
to keep a watchful eye on the workings of public agencies.”5 This right
of access applies to all “judicial decisions and the documents which
comprise the bases of those decisions,”6 including hearings,
depositions, and conferences. There is a strong common
law presumption in favor of public access to records filed with the
court in conjunction with any case, civil or criminal.7 There is also a
constitutional presumption in favor of public access, unless there is a
compelling government interest, and the terms of any secrecy order are
narrowly tailored to serve that interest.8 For the purposes of this Note,
whether the right of access stems from the Constitution or the common
law is of little concern. Factual circumstances under which the need
for privacy is strong enough to outweigh the common law right of
access, yet not compelling enough to overcome the constitutional right
3
4
5
6
7
8

See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 210, § 5C (1972).
Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978).
Id. at 598.
Grove Fresh Distribs. v. Everfresh Juice, 24 F.3d 893, 898 (7th Cir. 1994).
Wilson v. Am. Motors Corp., 759 F.2d 1568, 1569-70 (11th Cir. 1985).
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 606-07 (1982).
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of access, would be quite novel indeed. But no matter the source, the
right of access can be described best as a “presumption—however
gauged—in favor of public access to judicial records.”9
This presumption applies to more areas of judiciary law than just
trial records. One example is the area of settlement agreements. Parties
that wish to seal records as part of an integrated settlement agreement,
even with the court’s active encouragement, must still demonstrate
good cause to keep them sealed from the public.10 Also, in a class
action, a settlement agreement cannot prevent interested non-class
member parties from intervening to seek access to the discovery
materials, regardless of the terms of the agreement.11
A second example lies in the area of discovery. Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 26(c) presumes a right of public access to discovery
materials unless good cause is shown.12 Though the rule itself governs
the issuance of protective orders during discovery, its permissive
language indicates that “[u]nless the public has a presumptive right of
access to discovery materials, the party seeking to protect the materials
would have no need for a judicial order [because] the public would not
be allowed to examine the materials in any event.”13
A third example of legal arenas which are presumptively open to
the public and press are criminal plea agreements and hearings.
However, plea agreements for cooperative criminal defendants are not
subject to the right of access until those agreements are properly
filed.14 Also, the public does not have a right to access a plea
agreement filed with a motion to seal the agreement that is withdrawn
before the court can rule on the sealing.15 These two subtle variations

9
10
11
12

13
14
15

Nixon, 435 U.S. at 602.
Brown v. Advantage Eng’g, Inc., 960 F.2d 1013, 1016 (11th Cir. 1992).
In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 821 F.2d 139, 144 (2d Cir. 1987).
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c); see also Agent Orange, 821 F.2d at 145-46 (“A plain
reading of . . . Rule 26(c) demonstrates that the party seeking a protective order
has the burden of showing that good cause exists for issuance of that order. It is
equally apparent that the obverse also is true, . . . if good cause is not shown, the
discovery materials in question should not receive judicial protection and
therefore would be open [for public inspection]. . . . Any other conclusion
effectively would negate the good cause requirement of Rule 26(c).”).
Agent Orange, 821 F.2d at 145-46.
See In re Wash. Post Co., 807 F.2d 383, 390 (4th Cir. 1986).
See United States v. El-Sayegh, 131 F.3d 158, 159 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
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in the law create a more qualified right of access to criminal plea
agreements and hearings than a full right of access.
Although courts strongly favor the presumption of public access,
there are circumstances in which it can be overcome.16 Good cause is
one measure of such circumstances and serves as an exception to the
right of public access, essentially making the presumption rebuttable.
The term itself can be simply defined as the circumstances that warrant
non-disclosure because they are traditionally kept secret17 or
sensitive.18 The legal test has two broad prongs. The first prong
analyzes whether the proceeding has been historically open to the
public.19 The second prong analyzes “whether the right of access
fosters good operation of the courts and the government.”20 The party
seeking to maintain confidentiality bears the burden of satisfying both
prongs for the documents to remain sealed.21 In conjunction, the trial
court must balance the interests of the parties involved based on the
totality of the circumstances. If this burden is met, the district court
must “base its decision [to maintain confidentiality] on a compelling
reason and articulate the factual basis for its ruling, without relying on
hypothesis or conjecture.”22 Once the shielding party has shown good
cause, the burden to unseal shifts to the party seeking access.23
Illustrative of this standard is Nixon v. Warner Communications.
Nixon concerns a nuance of the sensitive material prohibition, where
access to evidentiary exhibits was denied because their contents were
already made public in the trial record.24 Certain audiotapes belonging
to ex-President Nixon were introduced into evidence at a trial for one
of his former advisors.25 The plaintiff wished to copy the tapes for
16

17

18
19
20
21
22
23

24
25

See Wilson, 759 F.2d at 1570 (right of public access is presumed absent unusual
circumstances).
See ROBERT TIMOTHY REAGAN, SEALING COURT RECORDS AND PROCEEDINGS:
A POCKET GUIDE, 3-16 (Fed. Jud. Ctr., 2010) (emphasis added).
See Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598 (emphasis added).
Reagan, supra note 18, at 3.
Id.
Kamakana v. City of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178-79 (9th Cir. 2006).
Hagestad v. Tragesser, 49 F.3d 1430, 1434 (9th Cir. 1995).
Chi. Trib. Co. v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 263 F.3d 1304, 1314-15 (11th Cir.
2001).
Nixon, 435 U.S. at 589.
Id. at 591.
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broadcasting and sale to the public.26 In refusing to release the tapes,
Justice Powell stated that under both the constitutional and common
law rights of access, the public had no right to the actual tapes in the
court’s possession, as historically there had never been a right to
access physical evidence,27 and the contents of the tapes had already
been made public and widely disseminated.28
Although Nixon did not fully explore whether the plaintiff met its
burden to show good cause, the case did identify situations where the
right of access has been denied for various reasons. For example, trade
secrets and other sources of business information that might harm a
litigant’s competitive standing are not disclosed, due to their sensitive
nature.29 Additionally, the right of access cannot be “used to gratify
private spite or promote public scandal” through the publication of
“the painful and sometimes disgusting details of a divorce case.”30
“Similarly, courts have refused to permit their files to serve as
reservoirs of libelous statements for press consumption.”31 Consistent
with this sentiment, Justice Powell further supported his denial of
access to the tapes by stating that “[t]he [C]ourt—as custodian of tapes
obtained by subpoena over the opposition of a sitting President . . . has
a responsibility to exercise an informed discretion as to release of the
tapes, with a sensitive appreciation of the circumstances that led to
their production.”32 In accord, the Sixth Circuit has suggested that a
defendant’s right to a fair trial, certain privacy rights of participants or
third parties, trade secrets, and national security are virtually the only
reasons which would justify a total closure of public records.33
In addition to the compelling reasons described above, the
presumption of public access to court records is further limited on a
state level. For example, New York articulated areas of law where it
has traditionally (writer’s emphasis) prevented public access: “in all
proceedings and trials in cases for divorce, seduction, abortion, rape,
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33

Id.
Id. at 608-09.
Id. at 609.
Id. at 598 (emphasis added).
Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598 (quoting In re Caswell, 29 A. 259 (R.I. 1893)).
Id.
Id. at 603.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 710 F.2d 1165, 1179
(6th Cir. 1983).
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assault with intent to commit rape, sodomy, bastardy or filiation, the
court may, in its discretion, exclude therefrom all persons who are not
directly interested therein, excepting jurors, witnesses, and officers of
the court.”34 New York also limits public access to family court
proceedings by statute.35 Although Section 166 of the Family Court
Act allows the court to permit public inspection of papers or records in
a particular case upon completion of an application process, this
procedure does not cause the record to be made available to the
general public at the courthouse.36 Most relevant to the subject of this
Note, New York also has a statutory prohibition on public access to
adoption orders.37 The relevant statute provides:
No person shall be allowed access to such sealed records and
order and any index thereof except upon an order of a judge or
surrogate of the court in which the order was made or of a justice
of the supreme court. No order for disclosure or access and
inspection shall be granted except on good cause shown and on
due notice to the adoptive parents and to such additional persons as
the court may direct.38

Other examples of restriction to the public’s right of access include
records in a sex offense case that might identify the victim,39 grand
jury minutes,40 and records that identify jurors.41
With such a large array of considerations and consequences
involving matters exempt from the public right of access, it makes
sense to afford trial judges the discretion to prohibit the general public
from reviewing any court record. Judge Michael Boudin, while sitting
on the First Circuit Court of Appeals, explained that courts needed
34

35
36
37
38
39

40

41

COMM’N TO PUBLIC ACCESS TO COURT RECORDS, REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUDGE
OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, 19 (2004) (citing N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 4
(2003)).
N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 166 (1962).
COMM’N TO PUBLIC ACCESS, supra note 35 (citing N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 166).
N.Y. DOM. REL. § 114 (1994).
Id. § 114(2).
COMM’N TO PUBLIC ACCESS, supra note 35 (citing N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 50b (2006)).
COMM’N TO PUBLIC ACCESS, supra note 35 (citing N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW
§ 190.25(4) (2014), N.Y. PENAL Law § 215.70 (1980)).
COMM’N TO PUBLIC ACCESS, supra note 35 (citing N.Y. JUD. LAW § 509(a)
(1996)).
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“wide latitude” and “broad discretion” regarding when and what
degree of confidentiality protection is needed. Boudin believed that
courts should be afforded “great deference . . . [when] framing and
administering” such protection.42 Yet this kind of discretion can prove
problematic for an adult adoptee. What guidance does the public’s
presumed right of access offer a trial judge in a family court
proceeding that is traditionally kept secret? Can precedent be reliable
when the nebulous43 good cause standard requires only that a trial
judge consider all the circumstances and then simply decide? Are the
policy considerations supporting the public’s right of access and its
good cause limitation relevant to matters concerning adoptions? The
ability to answer these questions requires an understanding of how
states handle adoptions.
III.

ADOPTION LAW

Adoption laws in the United States vary widely. Traditionally,
adoption law is set by the states and each state has its own governing
statute. There is no uniform standard for adoption practices in the
United States. The closest thing to a uniform standard is the Uniform
Adoption Act (UAA).44 The UAA was drafted in 1994, and aims to
reduce the “extraordinarily confusing system of state, federal, and
international laws and regulations.”45 Indeed, the UAA ambitiously
sets out to create an adoption code that is: (1) consistent with relevant
federal constitutional and statutory law;46 (2) delineates the legal
requirements and consequences of different kinds of adoption;47 (3)
42
43

44
45
46
47

Poliquin v. Garden Way, Inc., 989 F.2d 527, 532 (1st Cir. 1993).
Justice Powell conceded that “[i]t is difficult to distill from the relatively few
judicial decisions a comprehensive definition of what is referred to as the
common-law right of access or to identify all the factors to be weighed in
determining whether access is appropriate. The few cases that have recognized
such a right do agree that the decision as to access is one best left to the sound
discretion of the trial court, a discretion to be exercised in light of the relevant
facts and circumstances of the particular case. In any event, we need not
undertake to delineate precisely the contours of the common-law right, as we
assume, arguendo, that it applies to the tapes at issue here.” Nixon, 435 U.S. at
598-99.
UNIF. ADOPTION ACT (1994).
See Id., Prefatory Note.
Id.
Id.
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promotes the integrity and finality of adoptions while discouraging
“trafficking” in minors;48 (4) respects the choices made by the parties
to an adoption about how much confidentiality or openness they prefer
in their relations with each other, subject, however, to judicial
protection of the adoptee’s welfare;49 and (5) promotes the interest of
minor children in being raised by individuals who are committed to,
and capable of, caring for them. 50 The UAA also provides the layman
with a basic semblance of the adoption process. The UAA allows any
individual to adopt or be adopted by another for the purpose of
creating a parent-child relationship between them.51 The biological
parent or parents must first relinquish all rights to their child.52 The
relinquished child is usually placed in the temporary custody of an
agency, until suitable parents can be found.53 Naturally, prospective
parents must undergo a screening and evaluation process to assess
parental fitness.54 Prospective parents then commence a civil
proceeding in a closed court.55 A trial judge will then issue a decree of
adoption.56 Following the decree, a new birth certificate will be
issued.57 Typically, all documents, exhibits, and data pertaining to the
adoption process will be sealed and remain confidential after the
adoption is finalized.58
Most adoption statutes have provisions that enable adult adoptees
to access their sealed court records. States employ a wide variety of
approaches in regard to requests to obtain records relating to adoption
proceedings, some of which share common elements. One of these
approaches grants the adult adoptee seeking court records unfettered
access. This category places no legal burden on the adult adoptee
seeking information. For example, Tennessee59 grants this unfettered
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. § 1-102.
See Id. § 2-403, 2-406-07.
See Id. § 2-103, 2-105, 3-204.
Id. § 2-201.
Id. § 3-203.
Id. § 3-705.
Id. § 3-802.
Id. § 6-101-02.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-127 (1996).
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access, and allows adult adoptees unrestricted access to their original
adoption proceedings after reaching the age of twenty-one.60 The only
burden on the adult adoptee is an administrative burden, requiring the
adoptee seeking records to file a written request to the Department of
Public Welfare.61 This is the ideal approach for an adult adoptee, and
is one of the most comprehensive and progressive statutes in the
country concerning the recognition of adult adoptees’ right to access
information about themselves.
South Dakota and Oregon both follow a similar approach. South
Dakota allows adult adoptees unfettered access to adoption
proceedings upon reaching the “age of maturity.”62 South Dakota has
also created a voluntary adoption registry to facilitate the exchange of
information between adoptees and birth parents.63 Oregon specifies the
age of 18 as the age at which adult adoptees can access their adoption
proceedings,64 and also operates a voluntary adoption registry.65
Another approach acknowledges and accommodates adult
adoptees’ interest in their own adoption proceedings, but with
limitations. Alabama uses such an approach, allowing adult adoptees
to access their original birth certificates when they turn nineteen.66
However, the state also permits birth parents to specify a contact
preference if and when an adult adoptee requests his or her original
birth certificate from the State Registrar of Vital Statistics.67
Additionally, birth parents have the option to simply attach a medical
history with every issuance of a new birth certificate to the adopting
parents.68 But, the records for the adoption proceeding itself remain
sealed, except “for good cause shown.”69 No statutory provisions
further explain how good cause is defined in this instance.

60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69

Id. § 36-1-127(b)(3)(A).
Id. § 36-1-127(h).
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-6-15 (1986).
Id. § 25-6-15.3.
OR. REV. STAT. § 109.319 (4)(b) (2015).
Id. § 109.430 (2015).
See ALA. CODE § 26-10A-31(c) (2000); see also id. § 22-9A-12(c).
Id. § 22-9A-12(d).
Id.
Id. § 26-10A-31(c).
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Arizona requires adult adoptees to petition the court for access to
adoption proceedings.70 The Arizona statute requires a court order to
access non-identifying information, and the adult adoptee must
establish a “compelling need” for the disclosure of the information,
absent consent of the birth parents.71 This “compelling need” standard
is not defined within the statute. There are few illustrative cases in
Arizona, and those that attempt to provide insight may leave adult
adoptees with more questions than answers. In one case, Arizona
concluded that the request to access the adoption records to obtain
information about service of process presented a [compelling interest]
to unseal the file, in light of a possible jurisdictional defect. 72 In
another case, the integrity of the judicial process was held to be a
compelling interest under circumstances where parties who relied on a
trial judge’s express assurances would be harmed by release of a
video.73 These cases offer no guidance to adult adoptees seeking
sealed records for other, perhaps more personal reasons.
Echoing the “compelling need” standard is the “good cause”
standard. This widely used standard, applied in states such as
Vermont, Georgia, and Massachusetts, is the standard adopted by the
UAA.74 Albeit, Vermont is the only state to have actually implemented
the UAA thus far.75 Georgia adoption law stipulates:
Records may be examined by the parties at interest in the
adoption and their attorneys when, after written petition has been
presented to the court having jurisdiction and after the department
and the appropriate child-placing agency have received at least 30
days’ prior written notice of the filing of such petition, the matter
has come on before the court in chambers and, good cause having
been shown to the court, the court has entered an order permitting
such examination.76

70
71
72

73
74
75

76

See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-120(B) (2003).
Id. § 8-121(D).
In re Hernandez, 2012 Ariz. App. Unpub. LEXIS 618 at *12 (Ariz. Ct. App.
2012).
Perry v. Brown, 667 F.3d 1078, 1084 (9th Cir. 2012).
UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 6-105(c)(1).
Legislative Fact Sheet- Adoption Act (1994), available at http://www
.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Adoption%20Act%20(1994).
GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-23(a) (2011).
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Massachusetts adoption law, which also contains a good cause
standard, provides:
All petitions for adoption, all reports submitted thereunder and
all pleadings, papers or documents filed in connection therewith,
docket entries in the permanent docket and record books shall not
be available for inspection, unless a judge of probate of the county
where such records are kept, for good cause shown, shall otherwise
77
order.

Nowhere in the statutory scheme of either of these states’ codes is
“good cause” defined.
The approaches discussed above are not exhaustive. Of all the
possible approaches that states could utilize to address the question of
access to adoption proceedings, the good cause standard, as written in
Georgia and Massachusetts state statutes, creates the biggest hurdle for
adult adoptees due to uncertainty and vagueness.
IV.

INCONSISTENCY IN GOOD CAUSE JURISDICTIONS

When addressing the issue of adult adoptees seeking access to their
birth records or adoption proceedings, there is no clear standard
articulated in a good cause provision. As described above,78 good
cause is viewed as a way to balance interests. Indeed, the application
of a balancing test would likely be adequate in cases where adult
adoptees seek access to their adoption records, provided courts have
the means to intelligently apply it. Courts in good cause jurisdictions
have noted the lack of guidance they receive from state legislatures
when determining what interests to balance. When confronted with the
issue, some courts have simply sidestepped it, choosing to deny access
to the adult adoptee and wait for the legislature to define good cause.79
For example, in Backes v. Catholic Family & Community Services, a
New Jersey trial court refused to appoint an intermediary that would
have allowed an adult adoptee to make contact with his birth parents
because there was no express authority for the court to do so, despite
the presence of statutory “good cause” language.80 Though the court
77
78
79

80

MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 210, § 5C (2015).
See supra Part II.
Backes v. Cath. Fam. & Cmty. Servs., 509 A.2d 283 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1985).
Id. at 294.
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followed prior case law by considering both parental privacy
interests81 and the adult adoptee’s interests in his own medical history
and psychological health,82 it effectively held that unknown policy
considerations in pending legislation outweighed an adult adoptee’s
interest in accessing personal information.83
Other courts have recognized an implied good cause standard from
vague statutory schemes.84 For example, In re Roger B. concerned a
challenge to a discretionary statute by an adult adoptee who sought
information about his birth family because of feelings of inadequacy
and uncertainty as to his background based solely on the fact that he
was adopted.85 The relevant statute sealed adoption records and
original birth records, and only permitted unsealing with a valid court
order.86 The adoptee challenged the statute, claiming that it infringed
upon a fundamental right, created a suspect classification in violation
of the Equal Protection clause of the United States Constitution, and
violated his right to receive information.87 While acknowledging that
information regarding one’s background, heritage, and heredity is
important to one’s identity, the court also noted that such information
was not within the ambit of any zone of privacy protected by the
Constitution, and thus did not implicate a fundamental right. 88 The
court then struck down the assertion that the statute created a suspect
class, noting that the status of an adoptee is created by a legal
proceeding,89 and does not result from “an immutable characteristic
determined solely by the accident of birth.”90 Finally, while
acknowledging that the right to receive information and ideas is
generally protected, the court noted that the Constitution does not
guarantee a right of access to information that is not available to the
public generally.91 With no express statutory language or prior case
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91

Id. at 292.
Id. at 293.
Id. at 294.
See In re Roger B., 418 N.E.2d 751 (Ill. 1981).
Id. at 752.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 754.
Id. at 756.
Id. (quoting Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684-86 (1973)).
Id. at 757.
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law to guide its decisions, the Supreme Court of Illinois nonetheless
found that the discretionary standard in the relevant statute survived
the adoptee’s constitutional challenge, comparatively implying that
good cause satisfactorily protected the rights of the parties involved.92
Some state statutes offer minimal guidance, such as allowing
access when unsealing an adoptee’s record meets a “best interests of
the child” standard.93 Others permit unsealing except under
circumstances where the adoptee, birth parents, or adoptive parents
would be prejudiced by the disclosure.94 Judges grasping for guidance
in interpreting good cause provisions not only receive little-to-nothing
from their respective legislatures, but also, as noted in Spinks, find
persuasive authority from other jurisdictions unsupportive.95
Such frustration is understandable considering the patchwork of
circumstances which satisfy the good cause standard today. Courts
have unsealed records based on severe psychological problems caused
by lack of information.96 Records have been unsealed to aid in
determining an “adopted person’s right of inheritance from his natural
parents.”97 The good cause standard has also been met by a religious
obligation to identify one’s ancestors.98 Furthermore, in past cases
where the good cause standard has been satisfied, adult adoptees have
been successful in accessing records based on an “intense”
psychological need to know.99 This last circumstance is particularly
puzzling, because courts have held that “mere curiosity” does not
establish good cause.100 What, then, is the difference between an
intense psychological need to know and mere curiosity? Even more
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frustrating to the adult adoptee is the denial of any explanation as to
why the good cause standard was not met.101
V.

BALANCING INTERESTS
A. Privacy

Privacy and confidentiality are central to the debate surrounding
adult adoptees’ abilities to access adoption proceedings. Standing
alone, these terms appear just as broad as the good cause standard
itself, necessitating a closer look at what privacy concerns arise in
adoption proceedings.
In Olmstead v. United States, Justice Taft stated that “the right to
be let alone [is] the most comprehensive of rights and the right most
valued by civilized men.”102 As discussed above, adoption proceedings
are traditionally kept secret from the public, and historically, courts
have been very protective of information in these proceedings when
third parties request access to such information.103 In People v. Doe, a
New York grand jury issued a subpoena requiring the county clerk to
produce the sealed records for all adoptions approved in the preceding
year.104 The court held that the request was too broad and that good
cause had not been shown.105 The court noted that, during adoption
proceedings, inquiry is made into many intimate details of the lives of
the biological parents, the adoptive parents, and others connected with
the proceeding.106 The court afforded substantial weight to a biological
mother and her child’s desire to prevent illegitimate births from being
publicized.107 Because the adoption process, an area of vital public
interest, required free and frank disclosure of confidential information,
the court maintained that information obtained in the proceeding
should be kept secret unless disclosure was absolutely necessary.108
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People v. Doe contemplated that bearing an illegitimate child
would have a disparaging impact on the birth parents, and justified
sealing adoption proceedings from the general public. Other courts
have reasoned that under some circumstances, the adoption process
can be quite traumatic for birth parents.109 In Application of Maples,
the Missouri Supreme Court stated the latter, articulating the need for
confidentiality during adoption proceedings.110 In arguably an overly
broad assertion, the court found that adoptions were often the product
of unfortunate mistakes, 111 and that the decision to give a child up for
adoption is agonizing for birth parents.112 The court noted the value of
secrecy surrounding adoption proceedings, stating that it gave solace
to troubled birth parents who sought to hide circumstances of
abandonment or neglect from their birth children.113
In addition to those of birth parents, the privacy interests of
adoptive parents are also considered in adoption proceedings. The
Illinois Supreme Court in In re Roger B stated that “[c]onfidentiality
also must be promoted to protect the right of the adopting parents.”114
The court regarded the decision to adopt as an intimate one—by taking
a child “into their home adopting parents have taken into their home a
child whom they will regard as their own and whom they will love,
support, and raise as an integral part of the family unit.”115 The court
further reasoned that adoptive parents need the opportunity to form a
stable family relationship free from outside intrusion.116 Such concerns
are the premise of the adoptive parents’ right to privacy.
Last but not least, courts have acknowledged the privacy interests
of adoptees. Sealing adoption records fully protects the adoptee’s
privacy interest during childhood.117 The sealed record shields the
adoptee and his or her new family from intrusion by the birth
family.118 This protects the adoptee “from any stigma resulting from
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118

In re Maples, 563 S.W.2d 760, 763 (Mo. 1978).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Roger B., 418 N.E.2d at 754-55.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 755.
Id.

2016

Good Cause is Bad News

117

illegitimacy, neglect, or abuse.”119 “The preclusion of outside
interference allows the adopted child to develop a relationship of love
and cohesiveness with the new family unit.”120
In addition to privacy rights, courts have also recognized the
state’s interest in protecting the integrity of the adoption system as a
whole. Courts have recognized that adoption exists “as a humane
solution to the serious social problem of children who are, or may
become unwanted, abused, or neglected.”121 The public’s interest in
protecting the adoption process lies in assuring that policy and practice
will not diminish the pool of prospective adoptive parents or “the
willingness of biological parents to make decisions which are best for
them and their children.”122
B. Disclosure
In contrast to the well-articulated arguments in favor of secrecy,
courts are slowly recognizing that permitting access to adoption
records provides benefits to adult adoptees. One of these benefits is
increased access to medical information. For example, in Chattman v.
Bennett, a married woman, wanting to begin her own family, made a
request to inspect her adoption records to ascertain whether there were
any genetic or hereditary factors in her background that might be
detrimental to her future children.123 Her concern constituted “good
cause” to allow her access to any medical reports or related matter
contained in the records of her adoption, and the court granted her
request.124 The subsequent order also directed that any non-pertinent
information be deleted, including the names of her natural parents.125
The court supported its decision with reference to a New York
Domestic Relations Law statute which governed the furnishing of an
adopted child’s medical history to the adoptive parents.126
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Objectively, medical information has great value and may
significantly impact the health of an adult adoptee. A more subjective
position suggests simple knowledge of the identity of his or her
biological parents may be important to an adult adoptee. Mills v.
Atlantic City Dep’t of Vital Stat. explored how much weight to give
this need to know.127 To address the question of whether a
psychological need to know satisfied good cause, the court discussed
the testimony and other evidence at length.128 While acknowledging
that mere curiosity is insufficient to satisfy good cause, the court
determined that “[a]n adoptee who is moved to a court proceeding
such as the one here is impelled by a need to know which is far deeper
than ‘mere curiosity.’”129 The court was convinced that the adult
adoptee’s testimony had “its origins in the psychological makeup of
the adoptee’s identity, self-image and perceptions of reality.”130 The
court noted the testimony of another adult adoptee who searched for
and found her natural mother, and stated that “in addition to the desire
to be able to relate hereditary and ethnic background information to
her children, she was driven to search by a deep-seated feeling of
unreality—that her origin was not from a human being but an adoption
agency.”131 The court recognized that those feelings “manifest
themselves in physical symptoms such as nervousness or insomnia.”132
Those feelings also present “a psychological inability of the adoptees
to devote themselves fully and wholeheartedly to their efforts. There
was a general feeling among the adoptees that the search is one for
mental contentment.”133
Corroborating this evidence, an expert witness testified “that the
need to search, far from being curiosity, arises from a deficiency in
their sense of self.”134 He further explained that “[i]n the case of an
adopted child the natural parents are unseen and unreal to the adoptee.
He or she is not able to de-mythologize them and a continuing sense of
127
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unreality pervades the self-image.”135 Based on the combined
testimony, the court was convinced that this compelling psychological
need constituted the good cause required to unseal the adoption
records in question.136
VI.

CONSIDERATIONS AND SOLUTION

How does a trial judge balance such sensitive considerations
surrounding the privacy of all parties concerned, with the need for
information that may be vital for the physical or psychological health
of the adult adoptee? Ideally, a trial judge would not bear such a
burden; there would be a legislative solution. Indeed, some courts have
expressly mentioned that “. . . the Legislature, as the creator of the
adoption process, is the appropriate forum to articulate changes in the
procedure for releasing such information in order to reflect changes in
societal attitudes.”137 As mentioned above, the Tennessee adoption
statute provides what is perhaps the most comprehensive solution to
the adult adoptee’s dilemma. But absent any guidance from their
legislatures, states that abide by the good cause standard can, and
should, take an alternative judicial measure to alleviate the hardship
that good cause poses on adoptees. The current burden on the adoptee
to show good cause to access records from his or her adoption
proceedings should shift in such a manner that the court prove good
cause to withhold access to such records.
As discussed above, the burden is currently on the adult adoptee to
demonstrate good cause when he or she wishes to unseal records. If
the burden were to shift to the court to show good cause for
withholding access, a trial judge would maintain the ability to preserve
confidentiality when necessary while catering to an adult adoptee’s
need to access information. This standard, first articulated in Mills, is
consistent with the good cause standard as it applies to matters that are
traditionally open to the public.138 The Mills court articulated the
following “procedural criteria to be a solution which protects the rights
of all parties, effectuates the intent of the Legislature and lessens the
legal and financial burden . . . [on adoptees].”139 Should the adoptee
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seeking access be a minor, then the burden to show good cause would
be on the adoptee.140 The need for medical information or information
regarding the minor’s heredity may constitute good cause in such a
situation, but that determination can only be made after weighing the
effect the revelation will have upon all parties and the best interests of
the minor child.141 If the adoptee is an adult, however, the burden of
proof shifts to the court to demonstrate that good cause is not
present.142 This shift is predicated on the idea that “[i]n certain
situations the request of the adult adoptee for information should be
granted as a matter of course.”143 For example, if a birth parent files
some indicia of consent to identification, access by the adult adoptee
should be automatically allowed.144 This would have the additional
effect of alleviating administrative burdens for adult adoptees, as they
would be able to forego a court hearing in favor of a simple consent
order or its equivalent.145
Consider the hypothetical situation where a trial judge must
balance an adult adoptee’s need to understand his or her medical
history with the privacy concerns of a biological mother who
conceived the adoptee as the unfortunate victim of rape or incest.
Though jarring, this situation is within the contemplation of adoption
statutes,146 and is not so far-fetched as to be beyond a trial judge’s
expectation to encounter it. If a trial judge applied the modified good
cause standard with burden shifting, the starting point would favor
disclosure. Yet, because of the circumstances surrounding the
adoptee’s birth, the privacy interests of the birth mother could truly
outweigh traditionally recognized circumstances supporting disclosure
(even the need to access medical information) in this situation. Under
the new burden shifting approach, the trial judge would demonstrate
good cause to keep the records sealed, and the birth mother’s privacy
would be maintained thereby satisfying the good cause standard.
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CONCLUSION

An adult adoptee attempting to access his or her own adoption
proceedings will not receive help in states that permit access only upon
showing good cause. It must seem arbitrary, almost capricious, to an
adoptee who is not permitted to inspect adoption records because he or
she does not show good cause. Though an ideal solution would come
from the legislature, courts must grapple with the good cause standard
until a better approach is adopted (pun intended). There is very little
case law consistent enough to serve as precedent when applying the
good cause standard. Moreover, statutes containing vague and
ambiguous language offer little guidance to the adoptee seeking access
to his or her records. Efforts like the Uniform Adoption Act only
become part of the problem.147 While navigating this confusing legal
terrain, trial judges must balance very important interests. Privacy
concerns for all parties involved must be weighed carefully against the
needs of adult adoptees.
Shifting the burden to the courts to show good cause to keep
records sealed would be a step in the right direction. The shift would
account for the needs of adult adoptees that were not contemplated
when statutes requiring a showing of good cause were drafted. Should
interests diverge enough, the court would still have the ability to
prevent disclosure. Burden shifting would also be minimally offensive
to the legislative intent behind disclosure statutes. It is unlikely that the
number of records requests by adult adoptees will decrease in the
foreseeable future, and hopefully, a new, consistent body of
jurisprudence using the new good cause standard will make it much
easier for courts to balance the interests of all parties.
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